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SOVEREIGNTY, SAFETY, AND SECURITY: TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS
UNDER THE STAFFORD AND HOMELAND SECURITY ACTS
Heidi K. Adams

I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of
1988 (Stafford Act), which provides federal guidance and support for disaster relief
efforts, American Indian tribal governments lack the ability to directly request a
presidential declaration of a major disaster in Indian country.1 Tribes governing
reservation land must instead formally request their state governors to ask the President
for federal assistance. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Homeland Act), which
supplies funds and program assistance to state and local governments in order to
prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, creates an effect similar to the Stafford Act with
respect to Indian tribes. Both the Stafford Act and the Homeland Act list tribes under
their constituencies, but only under the definition of “local governments.”2 As such, both
of these acts, one targeting general catastrophes and the other aimed at preventing and
responding to human-made disasters, force tribal governments to place themselves at
the mercy of their state executives. This not only creates administrative roadblocks in

*
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Annual Indian Law Writing Competition in 2012. The author sincerely thanks Patrick Sullivan and the
NALSA crew at Lewis & Clark Law School, as well as the generous competition sponsors: Sonosky,
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1
“Indian country” as referred to in this piece is a combination of both the accepted legal definition under
18 U.S.C. § 1151, which includes Indian reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian
allotments, and Indian lands not covered under this legal definition, particularly with regard to Alaska
Native villages. See generally Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government et al., 522 U.S. 520
(1998) (as a result of the holding in this case and the provisions of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act of 1971, many Alaska Native villages no longer qualify as “dependent Indian communities,” thereby
preventing most land held by Alaska Natives in that state from being considered part of “Indian country”
for purposes of jurisdiction). “American Indians” and “Natives” as referred to in this article are used
interchangeably as all-inclusive terms for the sake of brevity, and should be considered to reference
members of any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or indigenous community.
2
6 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A)–(B) (2003).
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situations where timely response is essential, but also infringes upon tribal sovereignty
and signifies a breach of the federal government’s duty to adequately provide for tribes. 3
In an attempt to address these concerns, the US House of Representatives is
currently reviewing a bill proposing amendments to the Stafford Act. The amendments
would provide tribes with the option of directly communicating emergency requests to
the President and federal agencies, thereby addressing the needs of Native
communities while reinforcing tribal sovereignty. 4 Congress should therefore amend the
Stafford Act as proposed, supporting the creation of a more robust emergency
management system that treats Indian tribes equally compared to state and local
governments.
Congress should also change the Homeland Act to mirror the amended version
of the Stafford Act. Unfortunately, the Homeland Act has received less attention during
the legislative proposal to amend the Stafford Act. This could be due to several factors:
first, the Homeland Act is relatively young and untested within Indian country. Second,
environmental threats and disparities in environmental justice seem more prevalent in
this time of climate change and increasingly extreme weather patterns. Third, media
coverage on the issue of climate change has risen, and along with it, increased
awareness of environmental justice issues. Compared to the emergence of
environmental justice awareness, the threat of foreign and domestic terrorism to tribes
seems miniscule. Still, tribes and their allies should advocate for amending the
Homeland Act now, in order to capitalize on the momentum of Congress’s current
attention to redrafting the language problems within the Stafford Act. Most importantly,
strengthening the position of Indian tribes within the paradigm of homeland security now
could prove to be pragmatic in the long-term, rather than waiting until real, significant
terror threats occur.
Even if these changes are made, a potential caveat lies in the broad diversity
between American Indian tribes. In some cases, smaller tribes with weaker resource
bases may be reluctant to alter the current scheme, as states often bear the brunt of
implementing and paying for disaster preparations and relief. Thus, it may be most
prudent for Congress to amend the Stafford and Homeland Acts in a way that would
provide dynamic flexibility between individual tribal governments. Specifically, these
3

Rob Capriccioso, Tribal Sovereignty Disaster Legislation Introduced, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA
NETWORK, May 25, 2011, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/05/tribal-sovereignty-disasterlegislation-introduced/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2012); see Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249
(Nov. 6, 2000) (acknowledging the unique legal relationship between the federal government and tribes
as “domestic dependent nations,” where the federal government not only recognizes and encourages
maximum tribal sovereignty, but also owes a trust duty to Indian tribes).
4
Id.
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amendments and subsequent programs would be stronger if crafted to echo the policies
of current federal environmental legislation, such as the Clean Water Act (CWA), the
Clean Air Act (CAA), and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). These statutes allow
tribes to determine internally if they want to apply for “Treatment in the Same Manner as
a State” (TAS)5 status and formulate their own tribal environmental regulation entities,
or if they wish to function entirely under the appropriate federal agency. In either case,
states are precluded in these pieces of legislation and administrative procedures from
participating in—or interfering with—tribal affairs. Thus, tribes would be afforded wide
latitude in determining how to exercise their inherent sovereignty.
This article analyzes the current effects of the Stafford and Homeland Acts’
provisions with regard to Indian country, including difficulties faced by tribes and social
justice implications for indigenous groups. The examination of applicable federal Indian
law and policy will follow, along with a discussion of the importance of tribal sovereignty
and the ways in which the current legislation violates these principles. Finally, this article
will conclude with a review of the 2011 proposed amendments to the Stafford Act, as
well as an outline of recommendations for Congress and tribal advocates to borrow
tenets from environmental regulation and weave these into disaster prevention and
recovery laws.
II. TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE STAFFORD AND HOMELAND ACTS
Under the Stafford and Homeland Acts, states are the primary beneficiaries. The
acts authorize the President to grant funds to states for disaster preparation and relief,
rather than funding efforts to “local governments.” 6 The Stafford Act defines “local
government” as including “an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization, or Alaska
Native village or organization.”7 The Homeland Act also lists “an Indian tribe or
authorized tribal organization, or in Alaska a Native village or Alaska Regional Native
Corporation” under its definition of “local government.”8 Thus, tribal lands are
subordinate to states within the structure of these statutes.
This is particularly harmful to tribes in light of the complex nature of Indian land
holdings. Indeed, jurisdiction and property ownership in Indian country are often
described in legal scholarship as intricate “patchwork” or as creating a “checkerboard.”
5

Treatment in the Same Manner as a State, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (June 25, 2012),
http://www.epa.gov/2012/06/tp/laws/tas.htm/American-Indian-Office-Tribal-Portal (last visited Nov. 16,
2012).
6
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 5121–5207 and 6 U.S.C. § 101–613 (2003).
7
42 U.S.C. § 5122(7)(B).
8
6 U.S.C. § 101(11)(B) (2003).
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Some land may be held in fee by tribal member individuals, or by the tribal government.
Or, some parcels may be held in trust by the federal government for tribal or individual
tribal member use. Numerous pieces of reservation land are leased to nontribal entities
by the tribes or the federal government. To complicate the situation further, many land
tracts in Indian country have multiple tribal member owners who hold restricted trust
land in undivided shares—a product of decades of estate and probate practices that
have continually fractionated Indian property allotments with each generation.9 Some of
these allotments never passed to Indian descendants, as non-Indians settled on
reservation lands that were “opened” by the federal government. This “checkerboard
pattern . . . renders management and regulation of those lands and the peoples on them
cumbersome at best.”10 Thus, in disaster law, adding the state as another player in this
scheme complicates the framework from every angle, from pre-disaster planning and
preparation to emergency response and recovery.
The Stafford Act provides program funds for “Pre-disaster Hazard Mitigation” that
are awarded as a result of recommendations to the President from state governors. 11
Each year by an October 1 deadline, state governors are required to identify and
recommend at least five local governments (including tribal governments) to receive this
type of funding.12 But state executives often have limited contact with tribes and tribal
governments. While statistics are not available to show how many tribes as “local
governments” are nominated by their respective state governors for federal pre-disaster
hazard mitigation help, it seems likely that tribes are underrepresented within this
scheme because the qualifications for such funding include proving cost-effectiveness
and need, which can be difficult to show when compared to more populous or urban
regions within a state. Thus, tribes face difficult barriers in garnering federal assistance
through their states’ recommendations.13
Nevertheless, for certain types of funding, states may be forced into lending
assistance to tribal governments. The Stafford Act requires that in order to be eligible for
“an increased Federal share for hazard mitigation measures . . . a State, local, or tribal
government shall develop . . . a mitigation plan that outlines processes for identifying
natural hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities of the area under the jurisdiction of the
government.”14 This section specifically names tribes as if they are separate and distinct
from local governments, requiring that “[e]ach mitigation plan developed by a local or
9

See generally Douglas R. Nash & Cecelia E. Burke, The Changing Landscape of Indian Estate Planning
and Probate: The American Indian Probate Reform Act, 5 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 121 (2006).
10
Id. at 127.
11
42 U.S.C. § 5133(d)(1)(A).
12
Id.
13
See infra Part V.
14
42 U.S.C. § 5165(a).
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tribal government shall (1) describe actions to mitigate hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities
identified under the plan; and (2) establish a strategy to implement those actions.” 15
States have a similar requirement to identify risks and vulnerabilities, but also to
“support development of local mitigation plans” and “provide for technical assistance to
local and tribal governments for mitigation planning.” 16 For Native communities, the
explicit reference to tribal governments is a definite improvement over a strict definition
of tribes as “local governments.” But while the Act expressly forces states to offer
technical support for tribal programs, this system ultimately contravenes federal Indian
policy and the spirit of tribal sovereignty.
The requirement of state governments to support mitigation planning efforts by
tribal governments may be helpful to tribes, but presents an anomaly within the
framework of federal Indian law. The separation of tribal and local governments under
this section of the Stafford Act underscores the inclusion of tribes in the competition for
state program assistance and federal funds along with cities, towns, and counties. Thus,
tribes should have state support equal to that of other local governments when creating
hazard mitigation plans. However, this still places tribal governments at the mercy of
their state executives, a concept that violates basic federal Indian law principles. 17
Similarly to pre-disaster hazard mitigation funding procedures, when disasters do
occur, tribes must again seek assistance from the President through their state
executive. But while the Stafford Act clearly states, “[a]ll requests for a declaration by
the President that an emergency exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected
State,” an exception may exist.18 Indeed, the President may act and declare a disaster
without gubernatorial request “when he determines that an emergency exists for which
the primary responsibility for response rests with the United States because the
emergency involves a subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, the Unites States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and
authority.”19 While tribes are not specifically mentioned in this section, the relationship
between the federal government and Indian tribes should fall under this category. Thus,
it is possible that the President has the ability to declare a major disaster in Indian
country notwithstanding a request from a state governor. This possibility has never been
exercised before 2010, begging the question of whether tribes are aware that they may

15

Id. at § 5165(b).
Id. at § 5165(c).
17
Federal Indian law prescribes a duty of the federal government to care for and act as fiduciary to tribes
on multiple levels. This relationship is discussed infra Part V.
18
42 U.S.C. § 5191(a).
19
Id. at § 5191(b).
16
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appeal to the federal government for disaster relief under this procedural exception. 20
Further, since this exception has been rarely and only recently exercised, it is unknown
when and how tribes would qualify for this direct assistance.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL AND DISASTER JUSTICE: VULNERABILITIES IN NATIVE COMMUNITIES
Native communities are one of the most disadvantaged groups in the United
States. Widespread poverty and lack of services are common throughout Indian
country, leading to vulnerability on many levels.21 For example, tribes and their
indigenous traditions may be particularly vulnerable to damage caused by
environmental change, as “[t]ribal cultural practices and religious beliefs are rooted in
the Earth and woven into the web of life. Tribal members use wildlife and plants and
other natural resources in ways that are different from other ethnic groups that exist
within the American society.”22 This dependence and closeness with the environment is
true even today; while some tribes in urban areas or with wealth sources (e.g., minerals,
gaming) have been able to modernize their lands and lifestyles, “traditional cultural and
religious beliefs and practices are still important components of the identities of
contemporary Indian people.”23 Indeed, when Native lands are threatened by disaster,
tribal members may lose access to food sources and important cultural sites, and
further suffer emotional trauma from the disaster itself.24
Because a healthful environment is so central to the continuance of indigenous
lifeways, environmental changes are often more likely to adversely affect tribes than
other communities. Even gradual changes in climate, rather than unexpected and
immediate disaster, can harm tribal groups. For instance, temperatures in the arctic
20

The Havasupai Tribe, traditionally residing around the Grand Canyon in Arizona, received direct FEMA
funding to assist with recovery from floods that devastated the area in October 2010. This marks the first
time that a Native tribe has received funds directly from FEMA exclusively for tribal use. Lee Allison,
Havasupai Tribe and FEMA sign disaster agreement today, ARIZ. GEOLOGY: BLOG OF THE STATE
GEOLOGIST OF ARIZ. (Jan. 27, 2011, 8:13 a.m.), http://arizonageology.blogspot.com/2011/01/havasu-tribeand-fema-sign-disaster.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
21
See Duane Champagne, Living or Surviving on Native American Reservations, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY
MEDIA NETWORK, Oct. 8, 2011, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/10/living-or-surviving-onnative-american-reservations/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
22
Dean B. Suagee, Dimensions of Environmental Justice in Indian Country and Native Alaska (Second
National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit Resource Paper Series, 2002), in CLIFFORD
RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW , POLICY & REGULATION 107 (Carolina Academic
Press 2009).
23
Id.
24
The Ute Indian Tribe suffered from major flooding and landslides in June 2011, and reported that
“[c]ultural sites are . . . expected to be damaged by flood waters and road closures will prevent access to
traditional hunting, gathering and ceremonial sites.” Ranae Bangerter & Geoff Liesik, Tribe declares
flooding emergency, VERNAL EXPRESS, June 8, 2011, http://www.vernal.com/stories/Tribe-declaresflooding-emergency-,1548086 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
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have increased more than in most areas of the globe, melting sea ice and glaciers,
thawing permafrost, and altering forest and tundra ecosystems. Aside from issues
affecting wildlife, which arctic peoples depend upon for subsistence, the physical
makeup of the changing arctic and subarctic is directly endangering indigenous
communities. In particular, the increasing arctic temperatures have caused the sea ice
to form later in the year than usual, and when the ice does form, it is smaller in area and
thinner than normal. The ice then attaches to the coast later in the season, breaks up
earlier, and melts earlier.25 The melting sea ice prevents the buildup of natural
protection of the shoreline from harsh storm surges.26
This devastating change has created insurmountable challenges for Native
villages in the arctic and subarctic regions. For example, the absence of the sea ice
buffer has allowed an onslaught of waves against the western coast of Alaska, causing
massive erosion and flooding. In one year, over one hundred fifty feet of beach at the
Native village of Kivalina disappeared into the sea, forcing villagers to line their
encroaching shores, in vain, with sandbags.27 Likewise, the village of Shishmaref,
located on an island above the Bering Strait, lost thirty feet of land in the span of two
hours during a storm. Shishmaref lies only a few feet above sea level, and now deals
with overnight erosion and flooding.28
As another example, the village of Newtok, Alaska, directly west of Bethel, has
similar problems with flooding and erosion. Newtok was constructed atop permafrost,
which has melted and shifted with the changes in northern climate.29 Buildings have
sunk into the ground, their foundations crumbling and mixing with leaking sewage.30
Shishmaref, Newtok, Kivalina, and others desperately seeking to move their
communities to safer, higher ground have appealed to Congress to help them relocate
25

Complaint at 4, lines 26–27, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil et al., 663, F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 30, 2009).
26
Id. The climate change situation in Alaska is also different from “the Lower 48” in terms of the
relationships between governmental entities and tribes, because the legal status of Alaska Natives is
unique. Only one reservation exists in Alaska, despite the state’s massive size. The remaining Native
tribes and villages were divided into twelve regional areas and incorporated into Native-owned
corporations. Thus, “tribal members” in the Lower 48 are akin to Alaska’s “Native shareholders.”
Furthermore, Alaska Natives—through village and regional corporations—hold most of their lands in fee
simple, rather than occupying lands held in trust for Native use by the federal government as in the Lower
48. See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §1601–1633.
27
Elizabeth Arnold, Tale of Two Alaskan Villages, NPR, July 29, 2008,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93029431 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
28
Moving Alaskan Villages Away from Encroaching Sea, NPR, Nov. 25, 2005,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5027517 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
29
Anna York, Alaskan village stands on leading edge of climate change, POWERING A NATION, 2012,
http://unc.news21.com/index.php/stories/alaska.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
30
Id.
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inland. Congress has failed to aid the villages, however. In 2008, the Senate did not
pass legislation that would have allowed appropriation of funds to relocate Alaska
coastal villages. Since then, the situation has become more dire with each season,
compelling Alaska Natives to seek federal assistance through the Stafford Act and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), rather than new legislation directly
addressing the concerns of the villages.31
FEMA, which is tasked with coordinating the federal government’s
responsibilities under the Stafford Act, has several disaster mitigation and recovery
programs that could be applicable to the climate changes threatening Alaska Native
villages.32 In order to qualify for most FEMA disaster mitigation grants, communities
must submit mitigation plans for FEMA’s approval.33 Most Alaska Native villages have
not done so; but for those that have, the villages face the problem of meeting FEMA’s
cost-effectiveness standards. Indeed, “[w]ith low populations and high construction
costs in rural Alaska [because of the difficult terrain and high cost of transportation]
village relocation projects have low benefit-to-cost ratios.”34 However, Alaska state
officials have begun to assist Native villages with creating mitigation plans, specifically
with the goal of obtaining grant funding from FEMA. 35 While this will undoubtedly aid
threatened Alaska Native groups in qualifying for disaster mitigation programs, the costbenefit analysis required by FEMA remains a significant hurdle because of the relatively
low populations and high cost of transporting and working in rural Alaska. Moreover,
FEMA generally provides grants on a statewide basis, rather than in local areas. 36
Given the size of Alaska and the isolation of some Native villages, federal aid under this
framework is unlikely.

31

Arnold, supra note 27. In 2012, Congress enacted the Quileute Indian Tribe Tsunami and Flood
Protection Act to assist the Quileute Tribe (located on the Olympic Peninsula in western Washington) with
moving several tribal buildings to higher ground. The act has given the tribe 785 acres of trust land carved
out of Olympic National Park, which will allow the Quileute to move the tribal school, elder center, and
other buildings out of the immediate tsunami zone and floodplain. Pub. L. No. 112-97, 126 Stat. 257
(2012). The legislation is likely a result of concerns for the vulnerable coastal lowlands following the 2011
earthquake and tsunami in Japan. See Richard Walker, Quileute Is Moving to Higher Ground, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK, Feb. 28, 2012,
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/02/28/quileute-is-moving-to-higher-ground-100321 (last
visited Nov. 16, 2012).
32
A 2009 federal government report lists thirty-one “imminently threatened” Alaska Native villages along
the Alaska coastline and river systems. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS GAO-09-551, ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: LIMITED PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON RELOCATING
VILLAGES THREATENED BY FLOODING AND EROSION 12 (June 2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09551.pdf (last visited on Nov. 16, 2012).
33
See 42 U.S.C. § 5133(c).
34
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 32, at 22–23.
35
Id. at 34.
36
Id. at 23, n.19.
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In addition, FEMA mitigation and recovery programs under the Stafford Act are
only applicable in areas that have been declared federal disasters. This poses a
problem for Alaska Native groups because “many of the villages are facing gradual
erosion problems and have not received a declared disaster designation, [so] they do
not qualify for these programs.” 37 Since the Stafford Act requires the governor of an
endangered state to request that the President declare a major disaster before FEMA
funding can be triggered, Alaska Native villages are thus dependent upon the governor
of Alaska to request federal assistance. Considering the remote isolation of many
villages and the fact that some are not incorporated as official towns, many villages are
unable to request either funding from the state or convince the governor that federal
funds are necessary. Where villages are able to gather state and/or federal assistance
in creating disaster mitigation plans, most are only able to mitigate their losses by
relocating to a safer area, which requires long-term planning and support. In most
cases, long-term state and federal aid for villages have proved grossly insufficient. 38
Of course, Alaska Native villages are not the only indigenous communities
threatened by climate change and other disasters. In the summer of 2011 alone,
numerous Indian reservations on the Great Plains faced serious flooding issues. The
Uintah and Ouray Reservation in northeast Utah depleted its own financial sources from
the Ute Tribe Emergency Management Department, as well as funds it had been given
from the state, in order to purchase sandbags for flooding.39 The Blackfeet Indian
Reservation in northwestern Montana suffered from flooding problems for several
months after an unusually harsh winter caused rivers and culverts to overflow from
melting snow on the Rocky Mountains.40 In eastern Montana, the Crow Indian
Reservation saw flooding from record rainfall, damaging hundreds of homes and
revealing that many of the homes should have been condemned long before the

37

Id. at 23.
“After [the village of Allakaket] was flooded in 1994 and almost completely destroyed . . . homes were
moved out of the floodplain . . . but many homes and infrastructure components were rebuilt or replaced
in or near the floodplain. In August 1995, FEMA and the Alaska Division of Emergency Services provided
a comprehensive plan to the people of Allakaket to use as guidance for completing the relocation process
over a 20-year period. Subsequently, without a lead federal or state entity for providing relocation
assistance and lacking the internal capacity and resources to sustain the relocation process, Allakaket
has made minimal progress over the last 14 years.” Id. at 41.
39
It is likely that the Ute Tribe is able to support its own Emergency Management Department because
the reservation is the second largest in the United States, and generates revenue through its oil and gas
drilling, as well as its water company that serves the three counties. Bangerter & Liesik, supra note 24.
40
I observed this firsthand during the summer of 2011 while I lived and worked on the Blackfeet
Reservation. Several of my clients and friends were forced to live with their family members in already
grossly inadequate housing units and used FEMA trailers because the tribal government was unable to
secure emergency housing.
38
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floodwaters destroyed them. 41 Many of these tribal members faced the prospect of
completely rebuilding or relocating rather than repairing their homes, causing
considerable hardship for some families. Additionally, the flooding in Montana was
statewide, triggering the governor to request and receive a presidential disaster
declaration.42 This secured some federal funding for tribes, but home ownership in
Indian country is often complex and not easily discernable.43 This presents an issue on
reservation lands because “[h]omes that are [tribally owned] are eligible for the FEMA
repair funds, but residents who own their homes are responsible for their own recovery
and repairs. For those homeowners, flood insurance would be key—but many don’t
have it.”44 Therefore, FEMA funding through gubernatorial request is ineffective in these
situations because no stopgap exists to cover uninsured or underinsured tribal
homeowners on federal trust land.
These examples of current disaster-related problems on tribal lands represent
the power disparity between tribal governments and states in obtaining assistance for
mitigation and recovery programs. Not only do American Indian and Alaska Native
communities face disaster on the same level as other communities, but their access to
funds and services from the federal government is hindered by the complex nature of
land ownership and jurisdiction in Indian country. As well, issues arise due to general
vulnerabilities in tribal infrastructure and lack of socioeconomic strength, coupled with
the stringent requirements for requesting federal disaster aid. These barriers signify a
gross discrepancy between disaster law and federal Indian law, and also indicate an
alarming failure on the part of the federal government to support tribal sovereignty.
IV. HOMELAND SECURITY: LACK OF PROTECTION FOR FIRST AMERICANS
Similar to the deficiencies in natural disaster law and procedure, the Homeland
Act falls short of addressing tribal-specific concerns. Border patrol in particular can be a
challenge to tribal governments, with 260 of the 7,400 miles of US international
boundaries lying on tribal lands.45 Critics have pointed to the potential for illegal border

41

Crow Reservation in Montana on the Long Road to Recovery, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK,
June 29, 2011, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/06/crow-reservation-in-montana-on-thelong-road-to-recovery/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Crow Reservation].
42
Id.
43
Many of my Blackfeet clients did not know if they owned their land parcels or the structures on them, or
if the tribe or the federal government owned them and “leased” them (usually for free) or held them in
trust for the use of tribal members.
44
Crow Reservation, supra note 41.
45
Jennifer Butts, Victims in Waiting: How the Homeland Security Act Falls Short of Fully Protecting Tribal
Lands, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 373, 383 (2004).
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crossings onto tribal lands where tribal law enforcement is severely limited. 46 Tribes that
do not abut international borders are also at risk, as their lands could be targeted by
domestic terrorists or other terror entities that have already successfully infiltrated US
borders.
Potential terrorism targets are easily found within reservation boundaries, such
as underground high-pressure interstate gas lines, manufacturing facilities catering to
the US Department of Defense, important freight train routes, nuclear power plants and
waste storage sites, hydroelectric dams, and even missile launch facilities. 47 In all of
these places, as soon as tribes exhaust their own resources for addressing terrorist
threats, state governments will likely control funding for preventing and immediately
responding to a terrorist attack. Indeed, the Homeland Act “ignores congressional
plenary power over the tribes, . . . [as states] are responsible for distributing the funding
from the Department of Homeland Security. . . . Just as a county, city, or town would be
subject to state control and supervision, so would a tribe.” 48 Subjecting tribes to state
control and supervision thus presents a flagrant violation of the tenets of federal Indian
law and tribal rights to self-governance, and ultimately leaves tribes vulnerable to
terrorist attack without adequate protections.
V. BALANCING INTERESTS: GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Modern federal Indian law rests upon three cases from the early 1800s, often
referred to as the “Marshall trilogy.” In Johnson v. M'Intosh,49 Cherokee Nation v. State
of Georgia,50 and Worcester v. State of Georgia,51 Chief Justice John Marshall laid
foundational principles for the relationship between the federal government and Indian
tribes.52 In Cherokee Nation, Marshall wrote that Indian tribes were neither state
entities, nor foreign powers. Instead, they were “domestic dependent nations,” where
the relationship between a tribe and the federal government is equal to that of “a ward

46

For instance, the Blackfeet Reservation consists of 1.5 million acres of land, including approximately
sixty miles along the Canadian border. The Reservation is internally patrolled by four to five on-duty tribal
police officers at any given time. Interview with Nathan St. Goddard, Tribal Attorney, Blackfeet Nation
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to his guardian.”53 This relationship, or “trust doctrine,” has been interpreted as a
fiduciary duty on the part of the federal government, with Congress ultimately
responsible for the trusteeship on behalf of Indian tribes. As such, in exchange for lands
and resources ceded by tribes to the federal government, the United States is
responsible for protecting and preserving the borders of Indian country. 54 A large part of
this includes keeping tribes safe from state encroachment by preventing states from
interfering with tribal affairs.55 But through a century and a half of harmful Indian
policies, “that relationship with the United States became tainted, and corrupted by the
betrayal of Andrew Jackson's Executive Branch and by Congress, just as the
relationship between all the other Indian tribes and the United States became tainted
and corrupted by betrayal.”56 Thus, the original holdings from the Marshall Court have
been twisted, confused, and eroded into modern common law that makes defining
today’s theoretical and de facto trust relationship nearly impossible.
Additionally, as a result of the civil rights movement in the 1960s, the federal
government initiated a general policy towards Indian self-determination, empowering
Congress to enact several laws aimed at strengthening tribal autonomy.57 Both the trust
doctrine and the self-determination policy highlight that there is a strong—albeit often
dysfunctional58—relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government. This
relationship, with a few exceptions left over from darker periods of federal Indian law, 59
precludes states from intruding upon tribal communities. The Stafford and Homeland
Acts clearly sidestep these principles by forcing tribes to route their disaster needs
through their respective state executives. As such, not only do these laws fail in keeping
consistent with federal Indian policy, but they also impede tribal abilities to exercise
sovereignty.
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In an effort to clarify federal Indian policy, President Clinton issued Executive
Order (EO) 13,175 in late 2000 entitled, “Consultation and Coordination with Indian
Tribal Governments.”60 In his order, the President outlined three fundamental principles
to guide governmental agencies in formulating policies that impact Indian country. First,
the order delineates the Marshall trilogy concepts of federal Indian law—that the US
government holds a special and unique legal relationship with tribes, where tribes are
“domestic dependent nations” under the protection of the United States as trustee.61
Second, the President recognized that “[a]s domestic dependent nations, Indian tribes
exercise inherent sovereign powers over their members and territory,” and that the
working relationship between tribes and the federal government is on a “government-togovernment basis.”62 Third, the EO states unequivocally that “[t]he United States
recognizes the right of Indian tribes to self-government and supports tribal sovereignty
and self-determination.”63 Again, the Stafford and Homeland Acts are crafted in such a
way to prevent this government-to-government communication between the United
States and tribes. Thus, these disaster laws do not conform to this important
presidential reiteration of the federal duty to protect and support tribal sovereignty.
Federal agencies following the three guidelines set forth in EO 13,175 are thus
instructed to respect tribal self-governance, and to create and implement policies
according to the trust relationship. In general, agencies must “grant Indian tribal
governments the maximum administrative discretion possible,” as well as defer to tribes
wherever possible when establishing agency standards and goals. 64 Despite the strong
language commanding maximum participation and deference to Indian tribal
governments, federal governmental agencies may struggle with ambiguities strewn
throughout the EO. For instance, defining the boundaries of where it is “possible” to
allow for maximum tribal discretion could cause glitches where agencies are forced to
balance the goals of preserving tribal sovereignty with resource allocation and
expertise. Particularly where agencies are not equipped with culturally competent
agency-tribal liaisons, following the EO could require overcoming significant
communication obstacles between agencies and tribes.
One way to defeat this obstacle is to prescribe specific programmatic functions
within agencies, where an employee trained in tribal relations is designated for the
position of ensuring support for tribal objectives, while also advocating internally for
60
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agencies to meaningfully consider and consult with tribes when promulgating policies
and regulations.65 Furthermore, this could aid in increasing general agency knowledge
and effectiveness, especially in the field of environmental regulation and response to
natural disasters where tribes are more acquainted with their local ecosystems than
outsiders.66
In addressing the shortcomings of self-determination policies, federal agencies
have begun taking steps to work cooperatively with tribal governments. In late 2009,
President Obama attempted to address ambiguities in EO 13,175 by issuing a
memorandum instructing agencies to complete “a detailed plan of actions [each] agency
will take to implement the policies and directives of Executive Order 13,175” within
ninety days.67 The President explained that his administration is “committed to regular
and meaningful consultation and collaboration with tribal officials in policy decisions that
have tribal implications.”68 Agencies were further directed to consult with tribal officials
in creating their plans, and to continually report on their progress to the President. 69
Following President Obama’s memorandum, FEMA in 2010 released a document
outlining its tribal policy. According to FEMA, in doing so it had “engaged all Federallyrecognized [sic] Tribes to gather suggested revisions to FEMA’s existing Tribal Policy,”
integrating feedback and ideas from these meetings in order to “enhance FEMA’s
relationship with the Nation’s American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal communities to
support preparing for, recovering from, mitigating, and responding to all natural and
manmade hazards and disasters.”70 Importantly, FEMA’s resulting policy states:
FEMA acknowledges the inherent sovereignty of American Indian and Alaska Native
Tribal governments, the trust responsibility of the federal government, and the nation-to65
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nation relationship between the US Government and American Indian and Alaska Native
Tribal governments as established by specific statutes, treaties, court decisions,
executive orders, regulations, and policies. FEMA further acknowledges the precedents
of the Constitution, the President of the United States, and the US Congress as the
foundation of this policy’s content.71

However, FEMA’s policy also states that while it will follow the spirit of the
policy’s content—presumably stemming from EO 13,175 and the 2009 Presidential
Memorandum—the policy will have to operate within the confines of existing law and will
remain consistent with current authority.72 But current authority points to the Stafford
and Homeland Acts, which lump tribes within the definition of “local governments.”
Therefore, without amending these two pieces of legislation, FEMA’s Tribal Policy
contradicts the procedural requirements of federal disaster law and ultimately has little
real effect upon practices of engaging tribes on a government-to-government basis.
While new policy from the executive branch requires “regular and meaningful
consultation and collaboration with tribal officials,”73 doing so could effectively mean
operating outside the construction of the Stafford and Homeland Acts.
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATION: ATTEMPTS TO ELEVATE TRIBAL STATUS
Congressman Nick J. Rahall from Wyoming introduced a bill in the House of
Representatives on May 24, 2011, proposing significant amendments to the Stafford Act
with regard to American Indian tribes.74 In addition to minor changes to the language of
the original Stafford Act, HR 1953 states under “Indian Tribal Government Requests”
that “[t]he Chief Executive of an affected Indian tribal government may submit a request
for declaration by the President that a major disaster exists.” 75 This simple provision is
key in addressing the barriers for tribal government in directly requesting and receiving
federal assistance. Additionally, the use of the word “may” in this amendment would
presumably allow tribes the option to continue routing requests through state
executives. This supports both tribal sovereignty—allowing tribes to autonomously
make decisions about whether to approach the federal government directly or to
continue within the Stafford Act’s historical scheme—and also indicates congressional
understanding of the wide variances between tribes and their respective resources and
interests.
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Next, HR 1953 would amend the Stafford Act to designate tribes as separate
government entities. The bill specifies that when a tribal chief executive requests a
declaration of disaster from the President in order to qualify for federal assistance,
“references to ‘State’ and ‘Governor’ in . . . this Act shall mean ‘Indian tribal government’
and the ‘Chief Executive’ of an affected Indian tribal government, respectively.”76 The
same language is repeated for emergency declarations in addition to major disaster
declarations. Furthermore, “Indian tribal government is defined” as “the governing body
of any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or community that the
secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe under the Federally
Recognized Indian Tribe List,” and that “[t]he term ‘Chief Executive’ means the person
who is recognized by the Secretary of the Interior as the chief elected administrative
officer of an Indian tribal government.”77 The proposed amendment clearly attempts to
be as inclusive with tribes as possible. Importantly, it also allows tribes the choice to opt
out, thereby supporting sovereignty principles in multiple ways. It potentially strengthens
the tribal-federal relationship as well by providing tribal governments with an avenue for
directly communicating their needs with the federal government—an ability that should
be protected on all levels of federal procedure in order to comply with foundations of
Indian law, EO 13,175, and President Obama’s 2009 Memorandum.
While the proposed amendment to the Stafford Act is a vital step for protecting
tribal self-government and strengthening the tribal-federal relationship, this change may
fall short of addressing increasing needs in Indian country. For instance, coastal villages
in Alaska facing climate change emergencies still would not qualify under FEMA costbenefit requirements and continue to face an uphill battle securing funds through the
traditional meaning of a “disaster.” Furthermore, the proposed amendment does not
necessarily provide additional scaffolding to support tribes in creating functional and
professional emergency management departments, so significant economic barriers
remain for smaller and poorer tribes.
In 2009, Congressman Frank Pallone, Jr. of New Jersey introduced HR 1697,
which is intended to “ensure the coordination and integration of Indian tribes in the
National Homeland Security strategy and to establish an Office of Tribal Government
Homeland Security within the Department of Homeland Security.” 78 The bill appears to
have died before reaching the Senate, but acknowledged in its findings that “[d]espite
the government-to-government relationship between Indian tribes and the United
States, the Unites States has failed to include and consult with Indian tribes with regard
76
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to homeland security prevention, protection, and response activities planning.” 79 The bill
would have provided for full participation of tribal governments within national security
strategies, as well as given tribes shares of funding to prevent and respond to terror
threats. The proposal outlined several goals for enhancing coordination of Indian tribes
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including meeting the federal
government’s trust responsibility to American Indians.80 If Congress had enacted this
piece of legislation, it would have elevated tribes to equal status as states and local
governments in dealing with terrorist threats. The failure to create a tribal government
department within DHS thus leaves tribes on the periphery of national security policies,
and limits the government-to-government relationship between tribes and the federal
government.
The death of HR 1697 is particularly disappointing considering the potential
shortcomings of HR 1953. The former would have made an extraordinary leap for
American Indian rights and sovereignty, providing tribes and DHS with a comprehensive
system that would have compelled the federal government to cooperate as equals with
tribal entities and to fund them accordingly. In contrast, HR 1953 would signify a step in
a healthy direction for tribal sovereignty, adding tribal governments in the Stafford Act
as separate from local and state governments. But HR 1953 does not acknowledge
basic and unique challenges in Indian country that must be addressed in order to make
disaster preparation, mitigation, and response systems fully effective.
VII. TREATING TRIBES IN THE SAME MANNER AS STATES IN DISASTER LAW
Treating tribal governments in the same way as states would address many of
these issues in both the Stafford and Homeland Acts. In fact, current regulations in
environmental law provide a glimpse of how this proposed framework could successfully
function. Under the CAA, CWA, and SDWA, tribes may be granted treatment as state
(TAS) status in order to allow tribal governments to exercise regulatory and civil
jurisdiction over tribal lands. The purpose of bestowing tribal TAS status is “to recognize
and promote the right of tribal governments to protect the health and welfare of their
members,” thereby reinforcing tribal sovereignty and strengthening the tribal-federal
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relationship by preventing outside encroachment upon tribal regulatory rights.81 Even if
the Stafford Act is amended through HR 1953 and Congress follows suit with a parallel
amendment to the Homeland Act, these provisions may be more beneficial to tribes if
additional procedures are inserted to echo those within the CAA, CWA, and SDWA.
In order to qualify for TAS status under these environmental statutes, tribes must
achieve the approval of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), through the
following conditions:
1. The tribe must be federally recognized and must be “exercising governmental
authority over a Federal Indian reservation.”
2. The tribe must have “a governing body carrying out substantial governmental
duties and powers.”
3. The functions exercised by the Indian tribe must pertain “to the management and
protection of water resources which are . . . held by the Indian tribe . . . [or] held
by the United States in trust for Indians . . . [or] held by a member of the Indian
Tribe if such property interest is subject to a trust restriction or alienation, or
otherwise within the borders of the Indian reservation.”
4. The Indian tribe must be “reasonably” capable, in the “Administrator’s judgment,
of carrying out the functions.”82

Once these baseline requirements are met, qualifying tribes must submit a statement
detailing the nature of the land and resources to be regulated by the tribe, as well as a
description of the management capabilities of the tribal administration. This description
should also contain a comprehensive plan for gaining the expertise and tools needed for
effective regulation, including a strategy for gaining the necessary funds for resource
management. 83
Tribal governments would be more likely to achieve a clearer understanding of
best practices for disaster prevention, mitigation, and recovery programs with the
implementation of these TAS status procedures. Tribes would be able to gain easier
access to a higher level of support from federal agencies during the planning process,
as this would elevate tribal status to a point where the EPA or FEMA would serve as
supporting agencies, rather than as the primary administering agencies. Most
importantly, TAS status under the Stafford and Homeland Acts would provide tribes the
option to internally prioritize safety and security issues, thereby providing tribal
81
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governments discretion in exercising their inherent sovereignty in protecting their lands
and people.
However, TAS status also has its shortcomings. It mirrors paternalistic policies
with strict application requirements, thereby forcing theoretically sovereign nations to
apply for power they should already possess. In addition, some Indian reservations
contain considerable populations of nontribal members who may resent being subject to
tribal jurisdiction. For instance, in the 1990s the EPA granted TAS status under the
CWA to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes in order to regulate pollutant
discharges on the Flathead Indian Reservation in Montana.84 The Flathead Reservation
holds within its boundaries several nontribal facilities owned in fee simple by state,
county, and municipality entities, in addition to a high population of nonmembers. 85
Several nontribal groups challenged the EPA’s TAS designation, questioning the tribes’
jurisdictional ability to control and regulate activities of nontribal entities within the
external boundaries of the reservation.86 While the court ultimately upheld the TAS
grant, the tribes faced much resistance and tension as a result of the EPA’s delegation
of authority.87
Finally, the TAS status framework cannot alleviate the challenges faced by
poorer and smaller tribes. Tribes without strong revenue sources would have difficulty
demonstrating to the administering agency that they could fund their own regulations for
disaster planning and response, especially if tribes want to lead planning efforts for
national security risks in addition to environmental disasters. Each area of disaster law
would require a different set of tools and expertise, thereby requiring more tribal time
and money to put these systems in place. Additionally, tribes with smaller population
and/or land bases would likely struggle to justify the use of limited resources for disaster
regulation. As such, a faithful application of the TAS status regime would probably not
function seamlessly in every tribal environmental or security management project.
Instead, the optimum approach for tribes could be a framework that combines TAS
regulations and the amended Stafford and Homeland Acts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The best option for tribes could be a hybrid of current and amended disaster laws
combined with the TAS status system in environmental law. Identifying and then
blending the best practices from both realms may be an ambitious task, as it would first
84
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require selecting the provisions that are most beneficial to tribal entities. Even through
careful selection and merging of these provisions, the resulting system would not
necessarily address the funding issue, which is often an underlying roadblock for
programs in Indian country. But it may still be worthwhile—the hybrid model could
compel the EPA, FEMA, DHS, Customs and Border Protection, and Congress to meet
tribal governments at an equal level to address the threats and interests of those in
Indian country. It would also create a dynamic system, wherein tribes that do have the
capability to implement their own disaster regulations would be able to do so with direct
federal support. At the same time, tribes that do not have the resources or choose not to
create their own programs could still rely on the federal government and retain their
sovereignty instead of appealing to states for assistance. Finally, a hybrid model would
also benefit the federal government by easing administrative burdens while satisfying
federal aims of supporting tribal self-governance.
Regardless of whether this hybrid strategy is employed in the future for tribes
within the disaster law realm, the Stafford and Homeland Acts must be amended to
remove tribal governments and lands from the legal definitions of “local government.”
The current statutes have proven too dangerous for the well-being of tribal lands and
peoples, as the laws force tribal governments to beg their state executives for
assistance that may never be granted, or may be granted in grossly inadequate form.
Thus, when disasters do strike in Indian country, tribal members often suffer needlessly
due to this basic lack of services and access. Amending the Stafford and Homeland
Acts would not only begin the process of addressing these dramatic shortcomings, but
would also comply with federal law regarding the US government’s obligations to
American Indian tribes and, perhaps most importantly, would give greater deference to
inherent tribal rights for sovereignty and self-determination. Without serious,
fundamental changes to these laws now, along with continual reassessment and
restructuring in the future shaping of disaster law, American Indians remain subject to
grave social injustices in times of great need.
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